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Exploring the Nature of  
Anti-Federalist Thought:
Republicanism and Liberalism in 
the Political Thought of Cato
CHRISTOPHER HALLENBROOK
S
cholarship of the American founding remains divided as to the nature 
of Anti-Federalist political philosophy. One school of thought contends 
that the Anti-Federalists were the heirs of the republican tradition, while 
the other maintains that the Anti-Federalists operated from a liberal 
worldview. Thus in what manner and to what extent Anti-Federalists draw upon 
the republican and/or liberal political traditions remains unclear. In answering 
this question I examine the writings of the Anti-Federalist Cato, analyzing what 
conceptualizations characterize Anti-Federalist thought and from what traditions 
of political philosophy these ideas arose. I also analyzie texts of the major traditions 
that my have had a formative inﬂuence on Anti-Federalist thought in order to 
provide a basis of comparison with the Anti-Federalists. As the Anti-Federalists 
played a crucial role in creating the Bill of Rights, these understandings will 
establish a framework for interpreting its role in American governance and 
jurisprudence.
Unlike their Federalist counterparts, the nature of whose political theory 
is widely agreed upon, the Anti-Federalists continue to stir debate over 
how to characterize their political philosophy. Various interpretations have 
categorized the Anti-Federalists as classical republicans, modern republicans 
and liberals. This inability to arrive at a consensus is perhaps best illustrated 
by Gordon Wood’s work on the subject. In Creation of the American Republic, 
Wood characterized the Anti-Federalists as traditionalists operating from a 
republican political worldview.1 Subsequently, Wood has revised his position 
on the Anti-Federalists, describing the Anti-Federalists as political innovators 
who break from traditional republican political principals and embrace 
liberal ones.2 These contrasting analyses are endemic of the disagreement 
that permeates scholarship on Anti-Federalist political philosophy. Given the 
diversity of opinions and lack of consensus over the nature of Anti-Federalist 
political thought, a more narrowly focused study that simultaneously tests 
for both liberal and republican inﬂuences in Anti-Federalist thought is 
warranted. 
The opportunity for such a study is provided in the writings of the Anti-
Federalist Cato. Focusing on Cato allows for a natural experiment as his 
political theory can be compared to three other works of political theory 
that present political philosophy using the motif of the Roman statesman 
Cato the Younger. These three Catos – Plutarch’s “Life of Cato the Younger,” 
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Joseph Addison’s Cato: A Tragedy and John Trenchard and 
Thomas Gordon’s Cato’s Letters: OR, Essays on Liberty, Civil 
and Religious, and Other Important Subjects – correspond to the 
classical republican, modern republican and liberal traditions, 
respectively. Implementation of this natural experiment reveals 
that in regards to the mechanisms required for the supervision 
and safe operation of government and the ills of the governors 
possessing interests divergent from those of the governed, the 
Anti-Federalist Cato operates from the basis of a liberal political 
theory.
Liberalism: An Overview
In the liberal tradition, men preexist government and only 
create it for their “mutual preservation and defense,” so that 
they may enjoy liberty, which they possess as a natural right, 
and its beneﬁts.3 In order to ensure that government serves these 
ends, a number of safeguards are implemented by which the 
people can monitor their government and inﬂuence its actions. 
These mechanisms include numerous representatives, frequent 
elections and rotation in ofﬁce.4 Such precautions serve to bind 
the interests of the governors to those of the governed, which 
is essential to ensuring that those in government act for the 
beneﬁt of the people as “most men will act for interest against 
duty, as often as they dare.”5 This supremacy of interest over 
duty necessitates that government be structured in such a way 
as to make it in men’s interest to do their duty. Hence the use 
of frequent elections to create constant competition among the 
people for elected positions.6 This constant competition makes 
it in the interest of those in government to do their duty, as if 
they do not, they will simply be voted out of ofﬁce in the near 
future.7 Liberal government is thus structured so as to give the 
people control in ensuring that it protects their liberty instead 
of curtailing it.
Political Liberty: The Centrality of Representation
While liberty is the great end for which government it formed, 
it is not a monolithic concept. Cato’s understanding of liberty 
is twofold. The ﬁrst type of liberty that Cato is concerned with 
is political liberty. Political liberty takes the form of freedom 
from government tyranny. Accordingly, Cato advocates placing 
numerous restrictions upon the governors that are designed 
to preserve the people’s liberty. These protections serve to 
prevent the consolidation of power into one of a few hands 
with sufﬁcient time to use them to establish and perpetuate 
despotism.8 Fundamentally, these safeguards are designed to 
make the governors accountable and responsive to the people. 
This is particularly evident when Cato insists on the direct 
election of the executive on the grounds that otherwise “the 
president cannot represent you [the people] because he is not 
of your [the people’s] own immediate choice.”9 But, where that 
direct choice exists, accountability and responsiveness follow. 
Furthermore, all citizens must possess the ability to partake 
in directly selecting the governors.10 If not all of the citizenry 
are able to participate in the selection of the members of their 
government, than those in power would be able to perpetuate 
their own authority.11 This continuation in power would 
occur by using a numerical minority to elect a government 
of a composition that is both favorable to the governors and 
not what the totality of the electorate would have chosen.12 
Additionally, the other fundamental manner in which these 
mechanisms operate is to create constant competition among 
those seeking ofﬁce to demonstrate who among them can best 
serve the people as the frequency with which they must answer 
to the people for their actions prevents them from following 
their own course independent of the people’s will.13 Thus, the 
structures of government are designed speciﬁcally to maintain 
the people’s freedom from arbitrary rule.
Despite its being formed by the consent of the governed, Cato 
does not see government as something that can be left alone 
to run its course. When it comes to preserving the ends of 
government, “a general presumption that rulers will govern 
well is not a sufﬁcient security;” a sentiment that Trenchard 
and Gordon’s Cato shares.14 To ensure the proper operation 
of government, the people must supervise their government.15 
Perhaps the most direct way that the people are able to do this 
is through a participatory representation, a subject on which 
Cato refers his readers to the writings of the Anti-Federalist 
Brutus on the grounds that “this subject has been so ably and 
fully treated by a writer under the signature of Brutus, that 
I shall content myself with referring you to him thereon.”16 
Cato’s referral serves as grounds for consideration of the two 
writers’ views on representation in tandem, as two disciples of 
the same principles of representation.
Before examining the nature of representation according to 
Brutus, it is important to ﬁrst consider the role representation 
plays in Brutus’s conception of government. To Brutus, 
government has no natural right to its authority, and therefore 
draws its legitimacy from the consent of those who choose to 
form it.17 The reason men decide to thus leave the state of nature 
by forming government is that in each individual pursuing his 
own ends in the state of nature, “the possessions or enjoyments 
of one were sacriﬁced to the views and designs of another; thus 
the weak were prey to the strong, the simple and unwary were 
subject to impositions from those who were more crafty and 
designing. In this state of things, every individual was insecure.”18 
To alleviate this insecurity, men consent among themselves to 
form government with the purpose of protecting their natural 
rights, including liberty.19 These liberties are protected by “the 
whole force of the community,” which, placed in the hands of 
government, is used to enforce the rule of law.20 To ensure that 
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the government is dutiful in using the rule of law to carry out 
its function of protecting natural rights, the people have the 
right to remove from government those who fail to properly 
protect the people’s natural rights.21 Accordingly, “a full and 
just representation of the people,” the deﬁning feature of free 
government, is required so that the people can exercise their 
will to ensure that government fulﬁlls its purpose of protecting 
natural rights through the rule of law.22 If such representation 
is lacking, “let the administration be good or ill, it still will 
be government, not according to the will of the people, but 
according to the will of the few.”23 
The fundamental principle upon which Brutus builds his 
theory of representation is that the relationship between the 
people and their representatives is that of principal and agent.24 
Representation is the mechanism by which the people “give 
their assent to the laws by which they are governed,” and 
accordingly it is the function of the representatives to “declare 
the sentiments of the people.”25 This requires the representatives 
to know and understand the needs, wants and will of the 
people, “for if they [the representatives] do not know, or are 
not disposed to speak the sentiments of the people, the people 
do not govern, but the sovereignty is in a few.”26 That failure by 
the representatives to accurately carryout the will of the people, 
thus substituting their own will for the will of the people, shifts 
governance from the people to a smaller body of individuals 
is essential as Brutus maintains that the people consenting to 
the laws “is the true criterion between free government and an 
arbitrary one.”27 Consequently, representatives as agents of the 
people are necessary for the people to ensure that government 
acts in accordance with the purpose for which they established 
it, the preservation of their natural right of liberty. In conceiving 
of representative as agent, Brutus echoes the sentiment of Cato’s 
Letters, where the prospering functioning of government requires 
that the people select “deputies, whose interest is the same with 
their own [sic], and whose property is so intermingled with 
theirs, and so engaged upon the same bottom, that principles 
and deputies must stand and fall together,” and therefore the 
deputies, the representatives of the people, will act as proper 
agents of their principles, the people.28
The most basic mechanism for preserving such a system is 
annual elections. The Anti-Federalist Cato favors annual 
elections on the grounds that “power connected, with a 
considerable duration, may be dangerous to the liberties of a 
republic.”29 This danger stems from the fact that a long term 
in ofﬁce delays the individual’s accountability to the people, 
presenting man’s ambition with the opportunity to thwart his 
duty.30 Just as Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato sees the opportunity 
for self-aggrandizement winning out over duty whenever the 
opportunity arises unaccompanied by signiﬁcant consequences, 
so the Anti-Federalist Cato views terms of extended duration as 
causing those in government to pursue their own ends instead 
of the will of the people.31 Any time the term of ofﬁce is for 
“any considerable time,” the ofﬁceholder “fancies that he may be 
great and glorious by oppressing his fellow citizens.”32 To counter 
such a threat, the Anti-Federalist Cato favors annual elections, 
asserting that, with the constant competition they create, the 
people “never will want [lack] men to execute whatever you 
[the people] could design.”33 The constant competition thus 
forces ofﬁceholders to remain continually abreast of the will of 
the people and carry it, and only it, into execution in order to 
remain in ofﬁce. Therefore, annual elections, the penultimate 
example of the frequent elections argued for in Cato’s Letters, by 
providing for short terms in ofﬁce, prevent the governors from 
viewing their time in ofﬁce as sufﬁciently long to allow them 
to aggrandize themselves at the expense of the people without 
fear of electoral reprisals and instead bind representatives to the 
will of the people as true agents.34 
In order for this system to function properly, it is necessary 
that these agents must represent the will of the entire 
people.35 Accordingly, more is needed than simply annual 
elections. Numerous representatives are required to ensure 
that the representative body is “capable of understanding 
the true interests of the society for which it acts.”36 Such 
understanding is only possible when the representatives of 
the people “are sufﬁciently numerous to be acquainted with 
the local condition and wants of the different districts” of the 
nation.37 In order to be acquainted with their constituents 
in such a manner, it is necessary that the representatives be 
chosen from among the people they are to represent, because 
“the very term, representative, implies, that the person or body 
chosen for this purpose, should resemble those who appoint 
them—a representation of the of the people of America, if it be 
a true one, must be like the people.”38 For Brutus this means 
that representation should be based on the characteristics of 
the people.39 Therefore, “the farmer, the merchant, mecanick, 
and other various orders of people, ought to be represented 
according to their respective weight and numbers” in society.40 
Additionally, to properly function as representatives, “the 
representatives ought to be intimately acquainted with the 
wants, understand the interests of the several orders of society, 
and feel a proper sense and becoming zeal to promote their 
prosperity.”41 In order to bring such a circumstance about “each 
class [of men] ought to have an opportunity of choosing their 
best informed men for the purpose [serving as representative].”42 
Thus, for any country, and especially one as large as the United 
States, representation must be numerous in order to properly 
represent all facets of the people and their will, for “one man, 
or a few men cannot possibly represent the feelings, opinions, 
and characters of a great multitude.”43
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A second major reason why annual elections must be for numerous 
representatives is that a small number of representatives, such 
as called for in the proposed Constitution, are “too few to resist 
the inﬂuence of corruption, and the temptation to treachery.”44 
Brutus concurs with Cato’s assessment, asserting with regards 
to the proposed size of Congress that “there will be no security 
in so small a body, against bribery, and corruption.”45 That 
a majority of a quorum of the legislature has the power to 
legislate causes him to warn that “twenty-ﬁve men will have 
the power to give away all the property of the citizens of these 
states – what security therefore can there be for the people, 
where the liberties and property are at the disposal of so few 
men? It will literally be a government in the hands of the few to 
oppress the many.”46 This danger is especially acute considering 
the power the executive can utilize to corrupt the legislature, 
for “this government will have in their gift a vast number of 
ofﬁces of great honor and emolument. The members of the 
legislature are not excluded from appointments; and twenty-
ﬁve of them, as the case may be, being secured, any measure 
may carry.”47 In this manner, the small size of the legislature 
makes it easy for the executive to corrupt them into favoring 
the executive’s policies regardless of the will of the people, 
which it is the representatives’ duty to follow. Moreover, Brutus 
addresses not just the former of Cato’s qualms, corruption, but 
also the latter, treachery. Brutus considers treachery a very real 
and very likely possibility on the grounds that “it is not to be 
expected that a legislature will be found in any country that will 
not have some of its members, who will pursue their private 
ends, and for which they will sacriﬁce the public good.”48 
Furthermore, this threat exists not from one individual, or 
even multiple individuals each acting alone for his own limited 
ends, because “men of this character are, generally, artful and 
designing, and frequently possess brilliant talents and abilities; 
they commonly act in concert, and agree to share the spoils of 
their country among them; they will keep their object ever in 
view, and follow it with constancy.”49 There is thus an ever-
present danger of cabals working deliberately and systematically 
against the interests and liberties of the people. These cabals 
are abetted by the small size of the legislature, as they need to 
secure fewer accomplices either through bribery or “where they 
ﬁnd members [of the legislature] proof against direct bribery 
or gifts of ofﬁces, they will endeavor to mislead their minds by 
specious and false reasoning, to impose upon their unsuspecting 
honesty by an affection of zeal for the public good.”50 Either 
way, the small size of the legislature aids the cabal.51 Thus, for 
Brutus and Cato, numerous representatives are also necessary 
to secure the legislature against bribery, corruption and general 
betrayal of the public, the purpose for which they are advocated 
for in Cato’s Letters.52
Finally, to prevent the numerous, annually elected representatives 
from becoming an aristocracy, it is necessary that the elections 
create a rotation in ofﬁce.53 One beneﬁt of such a rotation is that 
it would prevent individuals from serving so long that, despite 
facing elections each year, they develop, due to the habit of 
winning again and again, a separation from their constituency 
that undermines their effectiveness as agents of the people.54 
A rotation in ofﬁce would counter this separating tendency 
in that it “would give opportunity to bring forward a greater 
number of men to serve their country, and would return those, 
who had served, to their state, and afford them the advantage 
of becoming better acquainted with the condition and politics 
of their constituents.”55 It would thus rotate into ofﬁce men 
who had more recently lived as constituents and accordingly 
have fresher understandings of the needs and will of the people 
and return to life as a private citizen those who had served so 
that they can refresh their own understandings and therefore be 
better representatives if they are rotated back into ofﬁce. This 
goal for using rotation in ofﬁce of reminding the representatives 
of the conditions of private citizens is not limited to the Anti-
Federalists; it is also the rationale utilized by the Cato of Cato’s 
Letters when advocating rotation in ofﬁce.56
This combination of annual elections, numerous representatives 
and rotation in ofﬁce creates the constant competition that 
binds the interest of those in government to the interests of the 
people, the achievement of which is “the great art . . . in forming 
a good constitution.”57 Constant competition causes governors 
to act in accordance with the peoples’ desires in order to retain 
ofﬁce.58 As those who seek to take the place of those in power 
will also have to obey the people for the same reasons, “you 
[the people] never will want men to execute whatever you [the 
people] could design;” thus the will of the people will always 
be served as opposed to the government being self-serving at 
the expense of the people.59 In this manner, the annual election 
of numerous representatives who are frequently rotated out 
of ofﬁce serves to bind the interests of the governors to those 
of the governed, which Cato considers essential as he sees 
government as deteriorating into tyranny when it “erects[s] an 
interest separate from the ruled.”60 While taken together, these 
safeguards demonstrate that Cato’s ideal government possesses 
the electoral and representative safeguards called for in Cato’s 
Letters, what is even more signiﬁcant is that the Anti-Federalist 
Cato conceives of these safeguards as acting through interests.61 
Not only do the Anti-Federalist Cato and the Cato of Cato’s 
Letters utilize the same mechanisms – annual elections, numerous 
representatives and rotation in ofﬁce – but they envision them 
as protecting liberty in the same manner, by bringing the 
interest of those in government in line with the interests of the 
people.62 It is the commonality of this underlining justiﬁcation 
for taking similar precautions that speaks to the commonality 
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of the political theory of the Anti-Federalist Cato and Cato’s 
Letters with regards to representation. 
Economic Liberty
The other type of liberty that Cato considers essential is 
economic liberty, the freedom to pursue and enjoy the fruits 
of one’s labor. To this end, Cato insists that taxation be light 
and tariffs low, or ideally nonexistent. Of the former, he writes 
that “the most natural and equitable principle of apportioning 
taxes, would be in a ratio to their [the states’] property.”63 If 
other principles are used to assess taxation, the people will 
be subjected to “a long train of impositions which their [the 
rulers’] ingenuity will suggest” as those with power seek to 
prevent their lands from being taxed.64 The end result will be 
that the people are forced to “submit to be numbered like the 
slaves of an arbitrary despot,” while their property is taken and 
the wealthy rulers escape tax free.65 In this manner, the free 
citizen is deprived of a measure of his liberty, the liberty to 
enjoy the beneﬁts of his virtuous industry and frugality. Thus, 
when the people consent to the formation of government, it is 
to protect these two types of liberty, political and economic.
However, it is with regards to the results of this economic 
liberty that at ﬁrst blush Cato can appear to be less than liberal, 
that is in his concern for the negative effects of commerce in 
relation to virtue. Cato does express concern that “the progress 
of a commercial society begets luxury, the parent of inequality, 
the foe to virtue, and the enemy of restraint.”66 However, upon 
further examination it becomes evident that Cato is a staunch 
advocate of free trade. He envisions tariffs as a pernicious foe of 
prosperity. When tariffs are imposed “the price of commodities, 
useful as well as luxurious, must be increased.”67 As a result 
people will buy less, causing merchants to import less and trade 
to stagnate.68 With less trade, the import duties will yield less 
revenue, defeating the purpose of the tariffs, which Cato says 
are advocated by arguments that the revenue they produce 
will ﬁnance the federal government and eliminate the need 
for federal taxes.69 Regardless, the increased prices will require 
increased income in order for the people to not be harmed by 
the tariff.70 Cato thus concludes that ruin “must be the case for 
the farmer, whose produce will not increase, not in the ratio, 
with labour, utensils, and clothing; for that he must sell at the 
usual price or lower, perhaps caused by the decrease of trade; 
the consequence will be, that he must mortgage his farm, and 
then comes the inevitable bankruptcy.”71 As a result of these 
tariffs, the people are deprived of their liberty to the extent 
that the merchant is not free to trade, the consumer is not free 
to buy and the farmer is not free to work his lands. Thus, for 
Cato liberty and commerce go hand and hand, with liberty and 
the subsequent ability to enjoy the fruits of one’s own labor a 
necessary condition for trade to ﬂourish. This formulation is 
essential in that it demonstrates that with regards to trade the 
Anti-Federalist Cato is again in concurrence with the liberalism 
of Cato’s Letters, where Trenchard and Gordon’s Cato considers 
liberty to be perquisite that trade cannot exist without.72 
This concern for virtue could cause one to initially suspect 
a republican element to the political thought of the Anti-
Federalist Cato. Evaluating such a hypothesis requires examining 
just what constitutes the virtue that Cato is concerned with. 
While Cato does not engage in an extensive discussion of what 
virtue is, consideration of Cato’s purpose for virtue allows 
for the inference of what constitutes virtue for Cato. The 
principle purpose of virtue for Cato is that it allows for the 
preservation of liberty.73 Accordingly, virtue exists in regards to 
the people’s relationship with government.74 Signiﬁcantly, Cato 
conceives of the people as doing more than merely agreeing to 
the government as if it were some separate entity, to him they 
are also the ones whom the government consists of, stafﬁng 
the government through constant competition as has been 
previously discussed.75 As the government is thus composed 
of the people, they must possess the qualities that are required 
of good government. Thus, as “the magistrate should govern 
with wisdom and justice,” and “mildness and moderation” 
must prevail in government, the people must possess each of 
these virtues.76 Otherwise there is nowhere for a government 
staffed by the people to draw them from. In addition to stafﬁng 
the government, the people also require virtue in their role 
of checking the government. It is the duty of the people to 
safeguard liberty by preventing government from acting too 
autonomously.77 The way to do this is with constant vigilance 
and distrust towards those occupying the government.78 Being 
sovereign, the people can vote out those who endanger liberty 
or even move to further constrain the actions available to 
government in order to defend their liberty. However, in order 
to fulﬁll these duties, the people must possess and cherish virtue. 
Armed with industry and frugality, men will naturally rally to 
cause of liberty; having to “acquire property by their own toil,” 
and be thrifty with what was gained by the sweat of their brow, 
men will be tenacious in defense of their liberty.79 But when 
these virtuous are undermined by “luxury, dissipation and a 
passion for aristocratic distinctions,” liberty is “of course, less 
respected, and protected” by the people, making them more 
likely to accept tyranny.80 Thus, the virtue that Cato requires 
from the people for the proper operation of government and 
defense of liberty is a multifaceted combination of wisdom, 
justice, mildness, moderation, vigilance, industry and frugality. 
Being thus broken down into its component parts makes it 
evident that the virtue Cato conceives of is a far cry from the 
self-sacriﬁcing austerity of classical republicanism. Granted, 
both the Anti-Federalist Cato and Plutarch’s Cato conceptualize 
frugality as having a role in public life, however, the Anti-
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Federalist Cato lacks a constant dedication to state before self 
as a component of virtue. Instead, the Anti-Federalist Cato’s 
virtue focuses on the preservation of the individual’s right to 
liberty, an inherently liberal formulation.
Conclusion
That the Anti-Federalist Cato makes properly structured 
representation the essential tool for the preservation of the 
people’s political and economic liberty in much the same way 
that Trenchard and Gordon do in Cato’s Letters demonstrates 
the liberal nature of the Anti-Federalist Cato’s political thought. 
What makes this particularly fascinating is that, in light of the 
general agreement regarding the liberal nature of Federalist 
political theory, it means that the debate between the Federalists 
and the Anti-Federalists was not a debate between two separate 
schools of thought, as would be the case if the debate were 
between republicanism and liberalism, but was in fact a debate 
within liberalism. On the one hand, Anti-Federalist liberalism 
shows the inﬂuence of John Locke, emphasizing the preservation 
of the natural rights of the individual and considering the most 
signiﬁcant threat to these rights to be government. Conversely, 
Federalist liberalism demonstrates the inﬂuence of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, viewing the greatest threat to the rights of the 
individual as being not government, but the people themselves. 
This difference is at the very core of the debate between the 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, shaping their opinions with 
regards to the proper scope, role and structure of government, 
particularly whether steps are to check the government or the 
people. Thus, what is gleaned from the study of the Anti-
Federalist Cato is that the debate between the Federalists 
and the Anti-Federalists was driven not by the fundamental 
differences between liberalism and republicanism, but by 
differing fundamental assumptions within liberalism.
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